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Speaking Truth to Powerlessness
Howard Lesnick*

I have offers from three New York
firms, and wonder if you can tell me
which one is the most prestigious.

A third-year student seeking my
advice a year or two ago

The most striking aspect of Patrick Schiltz's essay is that it
directly addresses students. In word (the salutation) and deed (what
follows), he speaks, not to the folks who help rule the world (judges,
legislators, officials, weighty practitioners, and those rulers-once-or
twice-removed, professors), but to those who are hoping-dare
they?-to ascend to some future vacancy in those positions.
Schiltz's message is in two parts: First, he tells students
several important empirical truths (as he thinks they are):
the
sources of the extraordinary malaise that seems to be tightening its
grip on our profession in recent years (Parts I-III); the realities of
large-firm life (Parts IV, VI); the priorities that are driving so many
lawyers to live and work in so self-defeating a manner (Part V). He
then (Part VII) offers students some advice, "little picture" and ''big
picture." The former is full of important detail, not "little" at all, but
it is the two sentences of "big picture" advice that I want to note here:
[R]ight now, while you are still in law school, make the commitment-not just
in your head, but in your heart-that, although you are willing to work hard
and you would like to make a comfortable living, you are not going to let
money dominate your life to the exclusion of all else.... Make the decision

*

Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The title is a play

on a famous Quaker admonition, that we are called to "Speak Truth to Power."
example, THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITI'EE, SPEAK TRUTH TO POWER:

See, for

A QUAKER

SEARCH FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO VIOLENCE iv (1955), attributing the thought to "a charge given
to Eighteenth Century Friends." Those seeing themselves as wholly lacking in power may be no
more open to the voice of truth than are the powerful, for it may call on them to act
inconsistently with that vision of themselves.
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now that you will be the one who defines success for you-not your classmates,

not big law firms, not clients of big law firms, not the National Law Journal.1

There is much to ponder respecting the accuracy of both
Schiltz's diagnosis and his prescriptions, "big" and "little." I would
like, however, to focus this brief comment, not on the merits of those
thoughts, but on the question of how students (or young lawyers) are
to get from here to there--how one who does find some significant
power in the diagnosis, and some ingrained resonance with the rem
edy, might find himself or herself able to cross the existential abyss
that stands in the way of taking the challenge of the advice seriously.
Tacky though it surely is to begin by quoting oneself, I will re
call here the opening lines of the coursebook in professional respon
sibility that I published some half-dozen years ago:
As I was about to become a teacher, a wise friend said to me that, although
most teachers use people to teach things, teaching is using things to teach peo
ple.

I have set out in this book not to treat Professional Responsibility as the

thing that I am teaching, that is, as a body of knowledge or ideas that I am
transmitting or imparting to students.

My intention is

rather

to

use

Professional Responsibility, both doctrinal development and theoretical cri
tiques, to evoke in students their own responses to some fundamental ques
tions about themselves as emergent lawyers, to teach students to ask them
selves: Who am I? In my work as a lawyer, what will I be doing in the world?
What do I want to be doing in the world?2

Acknowledging that they are "far from easy to address," I
called these questions ones of identity. While a large part of the
power of Schiltz's essay is its ability dramatically to motivate
attention, I fear that attention will falter in the face of what I have
termed the "existential abyss," which works, I believe, to prompt
disengagement from the essay's unsettling prescriptions. The ''big
picture" advice that I have quoted places the reader squarely before
that abyss-one cannot thinh about advice to judge success by one's
own criteria without facing the questions of identity-and I would like
to venture a word or two to remind us that, in deciding whether to
turn away or risk the jump, we need not jump entirely in the dark,
but also to suggest that some of the "dark" is the product of legal
education and the prevailing norms of legal professionalism.

1.

Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy,

Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 924 (1999).
2.
HOWARD LESNICK, BEING A LAWYER: INDIVIDUAL CHOICE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW 1 (1992).
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The problem is this: For people who have "made it" in the pro
fessional world to suggest to people who have not that they should not
care too much about money is a chimerical effort at best. It is as
suredly far better to suggest, as Schiltz goes on to do, that they look to
their own criteria of success to find the place that money, prestige,
and similar goods should have in their life. Yet three mutually rein
forcing processes interact to render such a self-examination problem
atic.
First is the enduring human tendency to look outside oneself
for authoritative guidance. Nearly 350 years ago, George Fox, a fer
vently believing Christian (the founder of the Religious Society of
Friends), challenged his hearers: ''You will say, Christ saith this, and
the apostles say this; but what canst thou say?"3

Our contemporary

consumer culture ratchets up that tendency powerfully, raising our
children to think it self-evident that "the market" is our surest guide
to desirability, that what sells-and not some inherent criterion of
value-tells us what is worthwhile. So, the student whose inquiry
serves as the epigraph of this comment asked, not which firm did the
highest-quality work, would teach him best, treat him (or others) fair
est, or even ultimately make him the most money, but which was
highest in the opinions of others, irrespective of the grounds of their
judgment ("prestige").
Closer to home, the implicit and explicit messages of legal edu
cation inhibit the experience of choice, and discourage students from
inquiring into unspoken premises, whether about the legal system,
the larger social order, or the role of lawyers. The result is to rein
force the factors that lead a neophyte lawyer to conceive of his or her
task as to fit in, to view the world wholly as found, not made.4
Yet countervailing resources are there to be tapped:
You look at where you're going and where you are and it never makes sense,
but then you look back at where you've been and a pattem seems to emerge.
And if you project forward from that pattem, then sometimes you can come up
with something.5

3.

The Testimony of Margaret Fox, in 1 THE WORKS OF GEORGE Fox 50 (M.T.C. Gould

1975) (1931) (Testimony preceding Gould's 1975 reprint of the 1831 edition).
4.
For discussion, see Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a· Grain of Sand: The World of Law
and Lawyering as Portrayed in the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law School Curriculum, 37
UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1160-82 (1990), and my coursebook, LESNICK, supra note 2, at 219-28. (The
two sentences preceding the notecall in the text are taken from these works, pages 1182 and

226, respectively).
5.

ROBERT M. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 168 (1974).
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In Sandy Levinson's felicitous terms, professional norms, inculcated
by legal education, seek to work a "bleaching out" of such "merely
contingent aspects of the self' as one's race, gender, religion, or ethnic
background, in the cause of creating "almost purely fungible
members" of the profession.6 To "look back at where you've been" can
enable one to begin to struggle against that "bleaching out," and re
cover an identity that can provide a source of real engagement with
Schiltz's "big picture" advice.
For those who live, or at one time lived, within a religious
tradition, it can be a salient source of such an identity. Although at
times it answers too quickly, too glibly, religion most centrally
reminds us to ask the questions: Who am I? What do I want to be
doing in the world? It can supply a deeply rooted "personal" code, by
which the code of our profession may be judged; in that act of
judgment, the reflexive acceptance of the norms of the profession, and
the wider culture, can be offset. For what Robert Cover said of
Judaism is true, I believe, across the spectrum of religions: "The basic
word of Judaism is obligation ...."7 As has often been observed, the
words "religion" and "obligation" have a common root, ligare, "to
bind." Moreover, the obligation does not pertain only to the sectarian
observances of one's particular faith, but is salient throughout one's
daily life, most especially the world of work.8
These characteristics of a religious consciousness-obligation
and integration-are greatly strengthened by a third, what I have
termed "transcendence," the experience of awe, "of time as tinged with
eternity, finitude with infinity, the mundane as embodying the tran
scendent."9 That experience generates an imperative, a "call" or
"leading," a feeling of being impelled, not merely persuaded.10
A recollection (a "re-collection") of the call of one's religious
tradition can ground a complete reorientation of one's approach to the
practice of law. In law teacher Joseph Allegretti's words (speaking of
his own tradition):

6.

Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of

Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1578-79 (1993).
7.
Robert M. Cover, Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order, 5 J.L. &
RELIGION 65, 66 (1987).
8.
For brief expressions of this idea, drawn from the Muslim, Buddhist, Jewish and
Christian traditions, see Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in a Pluralist Society, 66
FORDHAM L. REV.1469, 1483-87 (1998).
9.

Id. at 1488.
For a fuller description of the process as I understand it, see HOWARD LESNICK,
LISTENING FOR GoD: RELIGION AJ'ffi MORAL DISCERl'-rMENT 78-84 (1998).
10.
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[I]f I begin to bring my religious values with me into the workplace, a curious
thing happens.

My work is placed in a wider, deeper frame of meaning.

No

longer am I a lawyer who happens to be a Christian on Sunday, but a follower
of Christ who is trying to live out my Christian calling within my role as a law
It is a small shift, just a rearrangement of a few words, to move from a
lawyer who is a Christian to a Christian who is a lawyer, but in that small shift
yer.

a whole new way of looking at work emerges ... _11

Understand that I am not pressing a return to religion, or an
initial embrace of it, on anyone who resonates decisively to any of the
multiple reasons for repudiating it. Religion is assuredly "an unlikely
savior."12 Indeed, for many, religion was in their lives an inauthentic
identity, imposed by one's community of origin, often in literally terri
fYing ways, and far more pernicious than the siren song of prestige
and success.
Beyond that, many are firmly rooted in a secular interaction
with the world. Although I have come to appreciate the special ways
in which religious language and practices can guide and fuel the
moral sense, 13 I do not claim rational entailment for such a percep
tion. Athens may speak to you in ways that Jerusalem does not.
George Fox's question persists, however: "What canst thou
say?" Consider this admonition of contemporary philosopher Robert
Nozick:
I do not say with Socrates that the unexamined life is not worth living-that is
unnecessarily harsh. However, when we guide our lives by our own pondered
thoughts, it then is our life we are living, not someone else's. In this sense, the
unexamined life is not lived as fully_l4

For one's thoughts to be "our own," however, they must be
something other than a simple parroting of introjected norms,
whether of society at large or of our profession. Consider, for exam
ple, what it means to "represent" someone, to act for a client. We all
know what the professional codes say about that-an impoverished,

11.

JOSEPH G. ALLEGRETTI, THE LAWYER'S CALLING:

CHRISTIAN FAITH AND LEGAL

PRACTICE 126 (1996).
12. This is the subtitle of Chapter 1 of DANIEL C. MAGUIRE, THE MoRAL CoRE OF JUDAISM
AND CHRISTIANITY:

RECLAIMING THE REVOLUTION 3 (1993).

Christianity, to Maguire, "seems

lost in its doctrinal and ecclesial co nstructs and trapped in tangential moral concerns," while
"an overly segregated Judaism has largely defaulted on the universalist dream of Isaiah." Id. at

4. For my own bill of indictment, see LESNICK, supra note 10, at 43-45.
13.
See LESNICK, supra note 10, at 48-51.
ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILISOPHICAL MEDITATIONS 15 (1989).
14.
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highly polarized, badly skewed stance.15 But more fundamental than
those shortcomings is the implicit assumption that an attomey must
envisage the act of representation as leaving untouched the client's
stance toward the world.
Lawyer-classicist James Boyd White
(purporting to speak for Socrates) condemns that assumption in these
terms: ''You say you are your client's friend, but ... in truth you are
not his friend, but his flatterer, which is to be his enemy. For your
concem is not with his real interests, but with assisting him to attain
whatever it is he may desire."16
Whatever the limitations of such a mindset as it affects the
quality of the representation of the client, 17 my major focus here is on
the lack of an awareness of choice, and responsibility for choice, in the
life of the lawyer. To perceive how constricted our vision in this re
gard normally is, consider (as if addressed to us as lawyers) Socrates'
challenge to Callicles, Plato's quintessential "practical" man of affairs:
You have lately embarked on a public career and are urging me to do the
same .... Surely then this is the moment for mutual examination.

Has any

citizen hitherto become a better man through the influence of Callicles?

Is there

anyone, foreign or native, slave or free, who owes to Callicles his conversion to
virtue from a previous wicked career of wrong-doing and debauchery and folly?
What will you say if you are asked this question, Callicles? What example will
you give of a man who has been improved by associating with you?18

15.

See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1980). Despite their

paying lip service to the idea of a lawyer as a "wise counselor," id. at n.18 (quoting Professional

Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1 159, 1 162 (1958)), our professional
norms cannot "envision a relationship between lawyers and clients in which one or the other is
not in charge of and dominant over the other." ALLEGRE'ITI, supra note 11, at 41 (emphasis
omitted). In my view, the culture of law practice and law schools, "in particular their obsessive
focus on rights, obligations and hierarchy of decisional authority," is the source of much of this
failing. Lesnick, supra note 8, at 1499 n. 132.
16.

James Boyd Whi-ce, The Ethics of Argument: Plato's Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer,

50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849, 875 ( 1983).
Recent scholarship has begun to explore the content of a concept of moral counseling that

See, e. g.,
Robert F. Cochran Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-at-Law: Lessons from Dostoyevsky,

takes seriously, but is not immobilized by, its theoretical and practical difficulties.

35 Hous. L. REV. 327, 378-97 (1998); Paul R. Tremblay, Practiced Moral Activism, 8 ST. THOMAS
L. REv. 9, 9-28 (1995). More broadly, see Professor White's superb essay, James Boyd White,
Meaning in the Life of a Lawyer, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 763 (1996).
Consider, for example, the critique of philosopher Alan Goldman: "The client may in
17.
fact lose his own sense of moral responsibility when he sees his most partisan interests warmly
embraced and given institutional respectability by his lawyer. .. .To be morally autonomous is
to assume moral responsibility for one's own actions . . . . "

ALAN H. GoLDMAN, THE MORAL

FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 126 (1980).
18.

PLATO, GoRGIAS *515a-b, in PLATO, GoRGIAS 128 (Walter Hamilton trans., Penguin

Books 1960) (n.d.) (emphasis added).
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If you answer, quickly and

righteously, that Plato's language is simply too, well, Victorian to de
serve serious engagement, and that anyway it is not a lawyer's job to
make a client a "better person," will there be nothing more that nags
at you?
If your honest answer is no, so be it. If you find it a bit more
troubling, if that feeling might have its source in a fleeting glimpse of
unexpected and hitherto unexplored possibilities, then I encourage
you to allow yourself to be troubled. It suggests that you might find
opportunity, and not only discomfort, in Pat Schiltz's invitation to es
say the abyss: "Make the decision now that you will be the one who
defines success for you."19

19.

Schiltz, supra note 1, at 924.

